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Abstract Using the 2004–2005 India Human Devel-
opment Survey data, we estimate and decompose the
earnings of household businesses owned by histori-
cally marginalized social groups known as Scheduled
Castes and Tribes (SCSTs) and non-SCSTs across the
earnings distribution. We find clear differences in
characteristics between the two types of businesses
with the former faring significantly worse. The mean
decomposition reveals that as much as 55 % of the
caste earnings gap could be attributed to the unex-
plained component. Quantile regressions suggest that
gaps are higher at lower deciles, providing some
evidence of a sticky floor. Finally, quantile decompo-
sitions reveal that the unexplained component is
greater at the lower and middle deciles than higher,
suggesting that SCST-owned businesses at the lower
and middle end of the conditional earnings distribution
face greater discrimination.
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business  Earning gaps  Quantile decomposition 
India
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1 Introduction
Ethnic and racial discrimination in labor markets, as
manifested in wage and occupational attainment gaps,
has been widely examined (e.g., Altonji and Blank
1999; Antecol and Bedard 2004; Atal et al. 2009). In
India too, labor market discrimination against histor-
ically disadvantaged caste groups, i.e., the former
untouchables (Scheduled Castes or SCs) and
marginalized tribal groups (Scheduled Tribes or
STs), is well documented, with SCs and STs earning
significantly lower wages and being allocated to less
prestigious jobs as compared to upper castes, after
controlling for their productive characteristics (Ban-
erjee and Knight 1985; Madheswaran and Attewell
2007; Das and Dutta 2007).1 However, the disadvan-
tage faced by these groups may not be limited merely
to wage employment and could extend to the realm of
self-employment as well. While there is a sizable
literature from the USA that studies racial differences
in entrepreneurship in terms of business creation rates,
survival, employment, profits and net worth (e.g.,
Fairlie 2004, 2006; Ahn 2011; Lofstrom and Bates
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2013), examination of such issues in the Indian context
is relatively recent, due to data constraints.2
Our paper attempts to fill this gap for India, by
assessing caste discrimination in household non-farm
businesses (‘businesses’ hereafter), which has been
possible due to the recent availability of good-quality
earnings data for such businesses. Given the small
scale of operations of these businesses, catering
mostly to customers in the local community, it is
highly plausible that businesses owned by low-caste
owners face discrimination at the hands of customers,
suppliers and lenders, since their caste status is easily
identifiable, unlike in large businesses with complex
ownership and management structures, where observ-
ing the caste of the owners might be less straightfor-
ward. However, discrimination could be directed
toward larger low-caste businesses too: In personal
interviews, rich SC entrepreneurs have discussed their
individual battles with caste discrimination as they
started their businesses.3 There are other ethnographic
accounts as well (Jodhka 2010; Prakash 2010) that
indicate the presence of persistent disadvantage and
discrimination in the self-employment arena, which
forms the motivation for the present study.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper
to examine caste gaps in earnings from household
businesses for India. We use the India Human
Development Survey data for 2004–2005 and employ
two methodologies for understanding the earnings
structure of businesses: OLS estimation of mean
earnings for businesses owned by SCs and STs and
non-SCST businesses; and quantile regressions for a
distributional analysis to look beyond the mean and to
understand ‘what happens where’ in the earnings
distribution. Correspondingly, we use decomposition
strategies to decompose the earnings gap between
SCST and non-SCST businesses into explained and
unexplained components (with the latter being indica-
tive of discrimination), at the mean and at various
quantiles of the earnings distribution.4
Our main findings are as follows. There are clear
differences in observable characteristics between
SCST and non-SCST businesses. The latter are more
urban, record larger number of total man-hours, have
better educated and richer owners, and are more likely
to have a business in a fixed workplace. These
disparities get reflected in both indicators of business
performance in the data—gross receipts and net
income—such that SCSTs, on average, perform
significantly poorly compared to non-SCSTs. The
Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition reveals that depend-
ing on the specification of variables, assuming that the
non-discriminatory earning structure is that of non-
SCSTs, at least 20 % of the net income gap could be
attributed to the unexplained or the discriminatory
component. Unconditional caste gaps in earnings are
higher at lower percentiles than at the higher per-
centiles. Thus, we find some evidence supporting a
‘sticky floor,’ a phenomenon observed in the context
of gender wage gaps in developing countries (e.g., Chi
and Li 2008; Carrillo et al. 2014). Quantile decompo-
sitions based on our preferred specification reveal that
the unexplained component is significant in the middle
part of the distribution (viz., between the fourth and
eighth deciles), where it hovers around 15 % of the
total gap in earnings.
In addition to contributing to the broader literature
on racial and ethnic disparities in small business
ownership from a developing country perspective, this
paper has significant policy implications, particularly
in the context of the current discourse on ‘Dalit
Capitalism’ in India—inspired by ‘Black Capitalism’
in the USA—by the Dalit Indian Chamber of Com-
merce and Industry (DICCI).5 DICCI believes that
Dalits should enter business and industry sectors as
entrepreneurs and use this route to become ‘job givers,
and not job seekers’ especially for others in their own
community and enhance their wealth, instead of being
dependent on the state for benefits. However, the
majority of Dalit businesses are small, owner-oper-
ated, survivalist household enterprises that do not have
2 The Employment–Unemployment Survey conducted by the
National Sample Survey (NSS) collects data on earnings of
salaried employees and casual workers, but not of the self-
employed.
3 See, for instance, interviews in Outlook Business, May 2,
2009, p. 25.
4 Large Indian data sets such as the NSS and Economic Census
define four broad social groups: Scheduled Castes (SCs),
Scheduled Tribes (STs), Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and
Footnote 4 continued
‘others.’ ‘Others’ is a reasonable approximation of the upper
castes. Even though these large omnibus administrative cate-
gories mask intra-group heterogeneity, it is standard practice to
use these for empirical estimation since data are available only
for these categories.
5 SCs use the term Dalit (meaning oppressed) as a term of pride.
More details about DICCI can be found at www.dicci.org.
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the potential to generate either employment or wealth
(Deshpande and Sharma 2013). Further, our results
indicate that discriminatory tendencies that exist in
labor markets may characterize business operations as
well.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows:
Sect. 2 contains a literature review; Sect. 3 outlines
the methodology; Sect. 4 discusses the data and
descriptive statistics; Sect. 5 presents the results,
while Sect. 6 discusses our findings. Section 7
concludes.
2 Review of related literature
Iyer et al. (2013) and Thorat and Sadana (2009) in
descriptive analyses using Indian Economic Census
data document caste differences in non-agricultural
enterprise ownership and performance.6 They find
SCs and STs to be underrepresented relative to their
population shares. Enterprises owned by SCSTs are
smaller in terms of number of workers, hire mostly
family labor, rely less on external sources of finance
and operate mostly in the unregistered unorganized
sector as compared to enterprises owned by non-
SCSTs. Deshpande and Sharma (2013) examine unit-
level data from two successive censuses of the micro-,
small and medium enterprises (MSME) sector to study
the nature of participation of marginalized groups in
self-employment and found that the MSME sector
exhibits very clear differences along business owners’
caste and gender, in virtually all business
characteristics.
This evidence of systematic differences, however,
does not prove discrimination; all the gaps in perfor-
mance could, in principle, be accounted for by
differences in characteristics of SCST and non-SCST
businesses.7 For example, in the USA, racial dispar-
ities in asset ownership and family background in self-
employment (with blacks being more disadvantaged
than whites) are among the most important factors
leading to differences in business creation and
performance (Dunn and Holtz-Eakin 2000; Hout and
Rosen 2000). However, even after controlling for
differences in characteristics, a significant proportion
of the performance gap remains unexplained and that
could be on account of discrimination or some
unobserved differences in behavior such as ability
and risk aversion or some factors not amenable to
measurement.
Discrimination manifests itself in self-employment
primarily in the form of consumer and credit market
discrimination. For example, Borjas and Bronars
(1989) study consumer discrimination and find that
relative gains of entering self-employment are reduced
for ethnic minorities because they have to compensate
white consumers by lowering prices charged for goods
and services. Coate and Tennyson (1992) study credit
discrimination assuming that lenders are unable to
observe entrepreneurial ability. Individuals from a
group discriminated against in the labor market will
receive less favorable terms in the credit market since
lenders know that for such individuals, the opportunity
cost of entering self-employment is lower, and, thus,
they are willing to take more risks. Such groups will be
charged higher interest rates, thereby reducing the
expected returns from self-employment. Empirical
analyses using data from the USA show that the
probability of loan denials and rates of interest charged
on approved loans is higher for black-owned busi-
nesses than whites (Blanchflower et al. 2003) and
probability of loan renewals is lesser for black- and
Hispanic-owned businesses (Asiedu et al. 2012).
Section 6 discusses the evidence from Prakash
(2010), Jodhka (2010) and Kumar (2013), among
others, to understand possible channels of discrimina-
tion against Dalit businesses in India.
3 Methodology
3.1 Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition framework
We first use the Blinder–Oaxaca method to decom-
pose the mean earnings gap from self-employment
between SCSTs and non-SCSTs into portions
attributable to differences in characteristics (the
explained component or composition effect) and
differences in returns to these endowments (the
unexplained component or coefficients effect) (Blin-
der 1973; Oaxaca 1973). While the unexplained
6 Audretsch et al. (2013) use NSS data to explore the influence
of religious and caste affiliation on occupation choice. They find
SCs and STs to be less likely to be self-employed.
7 The fact that SCSTs possess inferior characteristics suggests
some ‘pre-market’ discrimination (Deshpande 2011; Thorat and
Newman 2010).
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component can be attributed to discrimination, it is
highly plausible that this residual also includes the
effects of either unmeasurable or unobservable char-
acteristics. All decomposition exercises are subject to
this caveat. However, it is equally true that some pre-
market discrimination affects the formation of char-
acteristics, and thus, the explained component also
embodies the effects of past discrimination. Therefore,
estimates of the unexplained component from decom-
position exercises should not be taken as precise
measurements of ‘true’ discrimination, but as rough
estimates, providing orders of magnitude.
This method involves estimating earnings equa-
tions separately for individuals i of the different
groups g, SCSTs (group s) and non-SCSTs (group n):
wig ¼ Xgi bg þ ugi ð1Þ
where g = (n, s) denotes the two groups. The depen-
dent variable w is the natural log of earnings. Xi is the
vector of covariates for individual i, which contains
characteristics that would determine earnings. b is the
corresponding vector of coefficients, and u is the
random error term.
The gross difference in earnings between the two
groups can be written as:
G ¼ Xnb^n  Xsb^s ð2Þ
In order to decompose this gap, some assumptions
have to be made about the earnings structure that
would prevail in the absence of discrimination and
construct counterfactual earnings functions. One
counterfactual could be constructed by assuming that
the non-discriminatory earnings structure is the one
applicable to non-SCSTs.8 In that case, the counter-
factual earnings equation of the SCSTs would be
written as:
wcis ¼ Xsibn þ vsi ð3Þ
Adding and subtracting the counterfactual earnings
to Eq. (2), we arrive at:
G ¼ wn  ws ¼ Xn  Xsð Þb^n þ Xs b^n  b^s
 
ð4Þ
where the first term on the right-hand side represents
the part of the earnings differential due to differences
in characteristics and the second term represents
differences due to varying returns to the same
characteristics. The second term is the unexplained
component and is considered to be a reflection of
discrimination.
The decomposition is sensitive to the choice of the
non-discriminatory earnings structure, as the two
counterfactuals yield different estimates. To get
around this ‘index number problem,’ one solution is
to use the pooled estimates as the single counterfactual
(Oaxaca and Ransom 1994). Another solution, sug-
gested by Cotton (1988), is to construct the non-
discriminatory earnings structure as a convex linear
combination of the earnings structures of both groups.
3.2 Quantile regression decomposition
framework
Generalizing the traditional Blinder–Oaxaca decom-
position to analyze earnings gaps at different parts of
the earnings distribution, Machado and Mata (2005)
proposed a decomposition method that involves
estimating quantile regressions separately for the two
subgroups and then constructing a counterfactual
using covariates of one group and returns to those
covariates for the other group.
The conditional earnings distribution is estimated
by quantile regressions. The conditional quantile
function Qh (w|X) can be expressed using a linear
specification for each group as follows:
Qh wgjXg
  ¼ XTi;gbg;h for each h 2 ð0; 1Þ ð5Þ
where g = (n, s) denotes the two groups. w is the
natural log of earnings. Xi is the set of covariates for
individual i, bh are the coefficient vectors that need to
be estimated for the different hth quantiles. The
quantile regression coefficients can be interpreted as
the returns to various characteristics at different
quantiles of the conditional earnings distribution.
Next, Machado and Mata (2005) construct the
counterfactual unconditional earnings distribution
using estimates for the conditional quantile regres-
sions, which consists of the following steps:
1. Generate a random sample of size m from a
uniform distribution U [0,1]
8 One could also construct an alternative counterfactual by
assuming that the non-discriminatory earnings structure is the
one applicable to the SCSTs. However, the counterfactual based
on the non-SCST earnings structure is more intuitively appeal-
ing, as non-SCSTs are not discriminated against on account of
their caste identity.
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2. For each group, separately estimate m different
quantile regression coefficients
3. Generate a random sample of size m with
replacement from the empirical distribution of
the covariates for each group, Xs,i and Xn,i
4. Generate the counterfactual of interest by mul-
tiplying different combinations of quantile coef-
ficients and distribution of observables between
group s and group n after repeating this last step
m times.
Standard errors are computed using a bootstrapping
technique.
This simulation-based estimator relies on the
generation of a random sample with replacement to
construct the counterfactual unconditional earnings
distribution and comes at the cost of increased
computational time. Melly (2006) proposed a proce-
dure that is less computationally intensive and faster
by integrating the conditional earnings distribution
over the entire range of covariates to generate the
marginal unconditional distribution of log earnings.
This procedure uses all the information contained in
the covariates and makes the estimator more efficient
than the one suggested by Machado and Mata (2005).
The Melly (2006) and Machado and Mata (2005)
decompositions are numerically identical when the
number of simulations in the latter goes to infinity.
We construct a counterfactual for the SCST group
using the characteristics of SCSTs and the earning
structure for non-SCSTs here:
CFsh ¼ XTs;ibn;h ð6Þ
This yields the following decomposition:
Dh ¼ Qn;h  CFsh
 þ CFsh  Qs;h
  ð7Þ
The first term on the right-hand side represents the
effect of characteristics (explained component) and
the second the effect of returns to characteristics
(coefficients effect or unexplained component).
4 Data and descriptive statistics
4.1 Data
We use the India Human Development Survey (IHDS)
for 2004–2005, which is a nationally representative
data set covering 41,554 households across 1504
villages and 971 urban states in 33 states of India. The
modules of the survey collect data on a wide range of
questions relating to economic activity, income and
consumption expenditure, asset ownership, social
capital, education, health, marriage and fertility, etc.
The survey module on household non-farm busi-
nesses does not identify the primary decision-maker in
the business. However, we can identify specific
members in the household who worked in the business
and the amount of time they spent, in terms of days per
year and hours per day. Using that information, we
assume that the person who has spent maximum
number of hours in the business is the de facto
decision-maker.
We restrict the sample to those states where there
are at least 50 household businesses, leaving us with
22 states.9 We consider only male businesses (i.e.,
where men are the primary decision-makers) in the
main analysis because factors affecting selection into
self-employment vary along lines of gender; addition-
ally, in order to delineate the effect of caste, we need to
hold gender constant, so as not to confound the effect
of overlapping identities.10
The data canvasses information on two measures of
financial performance of the business: net income and
gross receipts. Our primary dependent variable is the
log of net income from the business over the last
12 months. Net income is computed as gross receipts
less hired workers’ wages less cost of materials, rent,
interest on loans, etc. One issue on which the data are
patchy is the use of unpaid family labor in these
businesses, which would affect the calculation of net
income. While some businesses in the data report the
individual components as well as a net income, others
report only the net income. However, our queries with
the IHDS team revealed that when hired labor is not
reported, it cannot be assumed that no labor was
9 These states are: Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh,
Punjab, Uttaranchal, Haryana, Delhi, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh,
Bihar, Tripura, Assam, West Bengal, Jharkhand, Orissa,
Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra
Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu.
10 In Appendix 2, we report results of the mean decomposition
for the sample of 1099 businesses where the primary decision-
makers are female (SCSTs: 266, non-SCSTs: 833). Since the
total sample of 1099 females is not sufficient to estimate
quantile decompositions with precision, we do not estimate
those. Using the non-SCST coefficients, 68.7 % of the mean
earnings gap is explained using our preferred specification, with
31 % remaining unexplained.
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actually hired. Thus, data do not allow us to clearly
distinguish between hired and unpaid family labor,
resulting in the inability to estimate ‘true’ net income.
We, thus, use the net income figures in the data as
reported. While expenditure-based indicators have
been found to be more reliable than income-based
measures in developing countries—on account of recall
errors, non-response and deliberate mis-reporting—for
an analysis focusing on enterprise performance, income
is the most appropriate outcome to consider.
As explanatory variables, we use individual-speci-
fic variables such as age, marital status and standard
years of education completed of the decision-maker;
household-specific variables such as wealth (proxied
by asset ownership), rural/urban status, whether
someone close to or within the household is an official
of the village panchayat/nagarpalika/ward committee
and membership in the following: business or profes-
sional group; credit or savings group; caste associa-
tion; development group and agricultural, milk or
other co-operative; and business-specific variables
such as number of family members who worked in the
business, total number of hours put into the business,
work place type and industry type.11 Admittedly,
business-specific variables and some household-speci-
fic variables such as membership in different types of
networks and wealth are potentially endogenous with
respect to business performance. However, as Fortin
et al. (2011) argue, decompositions are accounting
exercises that allow one to quantify the contribution of
factors to the difference in outcome between two
groups without necessarily shedding any light on the
mechanisms explaining the relationship between such
factors and outcomes.
As our sample is limited to only those households
that operate businesses, a potential limitation of our
estimations is that coefficients of earnings regressions
may be biased since individuals and households do not
randomly select into self-employment. Unfortunately,
our data set does not provide us with suitable instru-
ments to correct for selection.
4.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 lists the summary statistics for the whole
sample and for the sample of SCST and non-SCST
businesses separately. Of the total 7288 businesses,
1300 are owned by SCSTs (17.8 %) and the remaining
5988 by non-SCSTs (82.2 %).12
In terms of performance, the average net income for
non-SCST businesses (Rs. 45,218) is 1.76 times that
for SCST businesses (Rs. 25,640). A similar pattern
can be seen in the average gross receipts. Figure 1
plots the kernel density distribution of log income for
SCST and non-SCST businesses. The distribution of
incomes of non-SCST businesses lies distinctly to the
right of the SCST businesses.
This large difference in business performance could
be on account of a variety of characteristics, in most of
which there are clear differences between SCSTs and
non-SCSTs. The primary decision-maker is on aver-
age 39 years old, and 86 % of them are married. These
numbers are similar across SCST and non-SCST
decision-makers. However, average years of educa-
tion differ significantly by caste, with 8.3 years for
non-SCSTs and 5.7 years for SCSTs.
There is a distinctly different pattern in the rural–
urban distribution across castes with 33 % of SCST
households and 53 % of non-SCST households being
located in urban areas. There is also disparity in
material standard of living as reflected in asset
ownership, in that out of the 16 assets in the
questionnaire, non-SCSTs own approximately 8,
while SCSTs own around 5.13 We create a wealth
index using principal components analysis and divide
the sample into three groups following Filmer and
Pritchett (2001): those lying in the bottom 40 %
(poor), middle 40 % (middle) and the top 20 % (rich).
By this somewhat arbitrary definition, 65.2 % of
SCST households fall in the poor category, while
34.6 % of non-SCST households are poor. 27.4 and
42.7 % of SCSTs and non-SCSTs, respectively, are in
the middle, and 7.4 % of SCSTs and 22.7 % of non-
SCSTs are rich.
11 Definitions of variables are available in Appendix 1.
12 Since the decomposition methodology is applicable only to
pairs of groups, we club together relatively similar groups, albeit
with intra-group heterogeneity, into two broad dissimilar
groups.
13 The IHDS data contain information on the ownership of the
following 16 items (binary variables): cycle/bicycle, sewing
machine, generator set, mixer/grinder, air cooler, motorcycle/
scooter, black and white television, color television, clock/
watch, electric fan, chair or table, cot, telephone, cell phone,
refrigerator and pressure cooker.
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Table 1 Summary
statistics
Standard errors are reported
in parentheses. Net income
is defined as gross receipts
less hired workers’ wages
less all other expenses such
as costs of materials, rent,
interest on loans, etc
Variable All
enterprises
SCST
enterprises
Non-SCST
enterprises
Outcome variables
Gross receipts (Rs.) 108,015.8
(258,019)
58,804.02
(98,524.46)
118,708.7
(279,809.3)
Net income (Rs.) 41,726.15
(45,158.62)
25,640.14
(32,726.04)
45,218.44
(46,704.93)
Explanatory variables
Individual characteristics
Age (in years) 39.13
(12.43)
38.6
(12.53)
39.25
(12.4)
Married 0.86
(0.34)
0.86
(0.34)
0.86
(0.34)
Years of education 7.79
(4.64)
5.66
(4.57)
8.25
(4.53)
Household characteristics
SCST 17.84
(0.38)
Urban location 0.49
(0.5)
0.33
(0.47)
0.53
(0.5)
Membership in
Business group 0.08
(0.28)
0.06
(0.23)
0.09
(0.29)
Credit or savings group 0.07
(0.26)
0.07
(0.26)
0.07
(0.26)
Caste association 0.14
(0.35)
0.13
(0.33)
0.15
(0.35)
Development group 0.02
(0.14)
0.01
(0.1)
0.02
(0.15)
Co-operative 0.03
(0.18)
0.02
(0.15)
0.04
(0.19)
Village panchayat or ward committee 0.11
(0.31)
0.13
(0.33)
0.11
(0.31)
Business characteristics
Number of family workers 1.39
(0.7)
1.48
(0.8)
1.37
(0.67)
Number of hours 2585.73
(1614.59)
2065.16
(1480.38)
2698.74
(1620.45)
Workplace: home-based 0.25
(0.43)
0.26
(0.44)
0.25
(0.43)
Workplace: other fixed 0.52
(0.5)
0.4
(0.49)
0.55
(0.5)
Workplace: moving 0.23
(0.42)
0.35
(0.48)
0.2
(0.4)
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We also examine networks since these can affect
the decision to become self-employed, as well as the
prospective success of the business (Allen 2000). In
general, participation in such networks is low. 8 % of
all businesses are members of business or professional
groups with membership of SCST businesses being
below average (5 %). Participation in credit or savings
groups does not differ by caste, covering roughly 7 %
of owners. Membership in caste associations is 14 and
12 % for non-SCST and SCST businesses, respec-
tively. Membership in development groups and co-
operatives is miniscule across the board. In terms of
political networks, 12.5 % of SCSTs have someone in,
or close to, their household who has been an official in
local bodies, while for non-SCSTs, the corresponding
figure is 10.6 %.14 Overall, there is no discernible
pattern in network participation of the two groups in
our data.
These gaps in performance could also be related to
other characteristics, such as (a) the number of family
members who worked in the business: SCST busi-
nesses have greater than average number of family
members working in the business (1.47), as compared
to non-SCST businesses (1.37); and (b) the total
number of hours put in by everyone working in the
business: Non-SCST businesses record 1.3 times more
hours than their SCST counterparts.
In terms of business location, about 25 % of
businesses are home-based, and this proportion does
not differ by caste. 34 % of SCSTs and 20 % of non-
SCSTs have mobile workplaces, while the proportions
of non-SCSTs and SCSTs with fixed workplaces are
55 and 39, respectively. To the extent a fixed
workplace indicates permanency, it suggests that
non-SCST businesses are more stable and less
makeshift.
The most important sector for these businesses is
‘wholesale, retail trade and restaurants and hotels,’
which include activities such as running of ‘kirana’
(neighborhood grocery) stores, other grocery and
general stores, and petty shops. 56 % of non-SCST
businesses and 44.5 % of SCST businesses are
involved in this sector. About 13 % of businesses are
in manufacturing activities, and this proportion does
not vary by caste. The major activities here are
blacksmiths, carpenters and flour mills. About 16 % of
businesses are in the ‘community, social and personal
services’ sector. This includes activities such as
barbers, cycle repair shops and tailoring. These
examples also corroborate our intuition that these
businesses are engaged in low-end activities, and are
more survivalist than entrepreneurial.
Approximately 6.5 % of businesses are in the
‘transport, storage and communication’ sector, with
the proportion being the same across castes. Overall,
only 4 % of businesses are in the primary sector
(agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing), but 15 %
of SCST businesses are in this sector. Proportions in
‘construction’ and ‘financing, insurance, real estate
and business services’ are small, involving only about
2 % of businesses each. Businesses engaged in
‘mining and quarrying’ and ‘electricity, gas and
water’ sectors are practically non-existent, as
expected, since these highly capital-intensive activi-
ties are not conducive to self-employment.
5 Results
5.1 Earnings function estimates
Table 2 reports the OLS estimates with log income as
the dependent variable, for the pooled sample, and
separately by caste. We present estimates using two
specifications. Specification 1 uses only exogenous
explanatory variables. This includes age and age
squared (as proxies for experience), whether married
or not, years of education, whether urban or not, and
state of residence. Specification 2 is more exhaustive
and also includes potentially endogenous variables. In
Fig. 1 Kernel density of log income
14 This could possibly reflect the operation of the mandatory
22.5 % caste quotas in local bodies for SCSTs.
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Table 2 OLS estimation: pooled sample and caste-wise
Dependent variable: log income Specification 1 Specification 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled SCST Non-SCST Pooled SCST Non-SCST
SCST -0.349***
(0.056)
-0.103***
(0.039)
Age 0.017**
(0.008)
0.039**
(0.016)
0.016*
(0.009)
0.022***
(0.007)
0.039**
(0.016)
0.019**
(0.008)
Age squared/100 -0.017*
(0.009)
-0.038**
(0.018)
-0.016*
(0.010)
-0.024***
(0.008)
-0.043**
(0.018)
-0.021**
(0.009)
Married 0.141**
(0.056)
-0.078
(0.109)
0.185***
(0.059)
0.060
(0.051)
-0.053
(0.129)
0.091*
(0.048)
Years of education 0.055***
(0.004)
0.065***
(0.010)
0.052***
(0.004)
0.012***
(0.004)
0.011
(0.008)
0.013***
(0.004)
Asset ownership 0.150***
(0.009)
0.138***
(0.027)
0.151***
(0.009)
Urban location 0.721***
(0.049)
0.768***
(0.090)
0.707***
(0.051)
0.250***
(0.036)
0.261***
(0.076)
0.252***
(0.039)
Business or professional
group membership
0.158**
(0.063)
0.195
(0.127)
0.160**
(0.070)
Credit or savings group
membership
-0.120**
(0.048)
-0.124
(0.101)
-0.127**
(0.057)
Caste association membership -0.049
(0.060)
-0.075
(0.085)
-0.054
(0.072)
Development group/NGO
membership
0.067
(0.080)
0.535*
(0.295)
0.060
(0.082)
Co-operative membership -0.096
(0.096)
-0.236
(0.236)
-0.095
(0.102)
Village panchayat or
ward committee
-0.048
(0.064)
-0.042
(0.067)
-0.050
(0.081)
Log (number of hours) 0.552***
(0.029)
0.592***
(0.054)
0.530***
(0.031)
Number of workers -0.043*
(0.026)
-0.077
(0.051)
-0.026
(0.028)
Workplace-other fixed 0.267***
(0.049)
0.262***
(0.078)
0.273***
(0.055)
Workplace-moving 0.159***
(0.055)
0.085
(0.087)
0.178***
(0.061)
Constant 9.500***
(0.272)
9.975***
(0.340)
9.413***
(0.303)
5.280***
(0.280)
5.123***
(0.505)
5.507***
(0.319)
Observations 7271 1298 5973 7035 1252 5783
R2 0.304 0.378 0.252 0.514 0.653 0.454
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are reported in parentheses. State of residence dummy variables is included in
both specifications, whereas specification 2 also adds industry dummy variables
*** Significant at 1 %;** significant at 5 %;* significant at 10 %
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addition to variables in the first specification, we
include the asset ownership/wealth index, member-
ships in: business or professional groups, credit or
savings groups, caste associations, development
groups, co-operatives, political networks, number of
hours spent by everyone working in the business,
number of family members working in the businesses,
whether workplace is fixed or moving (reference
category is home-based) and industry type.15
The SCST dummy is negative and significant in
both specifications, indicating that ceteris paribus,
belonging to these marginalized groups, is negatively
correlated with income. As expected, earnings have a
quadratic relationship with the decision-maker’s age
such that earnings initially increase with age and start
to decline thereafter. Businesses operated by more
educated owners also perform better indicating that
more years of formal education may be associated
with higher managerial ability and business acumen.
Households owning more assets are able to overcome
liquidity constraints more easily, and we find that
asset-rich households own more profitable businesses.
Businesses in urban locations perform better possibly
due to proximity to markets and easier availability of
information. The number of hours spent working is
positively correlated with income, as expected. Busi-
nesses based on other fixed locations (outside of the
home) and that are mobile are correlated with higher
incomes than home-based businesses.
Pooled regressions impose the restriction that the
returns to included characteristics are the same for the
two caste groups. Since this assumption is not realistic,
particularly in the Indian context, we also report caste-
specific OLS regressions. Caste-specific OLS esti-
mates indicate that some variables—particularly those
related to memberships in business or professional
groups, development groups and credit groups—
correlate in different ways with performance of SCST
and non-SCST businesses.
5.2 Decomposition of the mean earnings gap
The results of the Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition with
log income as the dependent variable are presented in
Table 3.16 Panel A and Panel B of Table 3 display the
decomposition results using specification 1 and spec-
ification 2, respectively. Within each of these panels,
we report results using: coefficients from a pooled
model over both groups as the reference coefficients;
non-SCST coefficients, i.e., how SCST businesses
would fare if they were treated like non-SCST
businesses; and SCST coefficients, i.e., how non-
SCSTs would fare if they were treated like SCSTs.
It is apparent that as more variables are added in
moving from Panel A to Panel B, the explained
proportion increases and the unexplained proportion
decreases significantly. In Panel B, in the presence of
non-SCST coefficients, the unexplained component is
19 %. Using SCST coefficients, we see that the
unexplained proportion is 10.05 %, and for the pooled
model, the corresponding value is 16 %. Following
Banerjee and Knight (1985), we can take the geomet-
ric mean of the estimates based on the SCST
coefficients and non-SCST coefficients to yield a
single estimate of the unexplained component which
amounts to 13.8 %.
Which of the variables contributes the most to the
explained component? The lower panel of Table 3
shows the contribution of selected significant charac-
teristics to the overall explained part of the income
gap. Using the first specification, years of education
contributes 39–42 % of the explained component,
depending on the counterfactual earnings structure.
Urban location also accounts for 37–44 %. However,
in the second specification, the importance of years of
education and urban location declines significantly to
around 5 and 8 %, respectively, and number of hours
and asset ownership emerge as the dominant variables,
each accounting for approximately 30–40 % of the
explained component. Since variables such as years of
education and urban location are generally positively
correlated with asset ownership, it is not surprising
that upon controlling for the latter, the relative
importance of education and location declines.
15 As a robustness check, we also estimated three specifica-
tions: one with purely personal characteristics; second with
personal and household characteristics, and third one being the
same as the full specification with all variables. The results,
robust to alternative specifications, are available from the
authors upon request.
16 This is done using the STATA program ‘oaxaca’ (Jann
2008).
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5.3 Quantile regressions
For quantile regressions, we use the same two
specifications of the earnings function that we used
for the OLS regressions. The average gap in log
incomes of non-SCST-owned and SCST-owned busi-
nesses is 0.75, which corresponds to a gap of 112 % in
raw net incomes of the two types of businesses. This is
instructive, but when we juxtapose this against the log
income gap for the different quantiles, we see that
restricting the analysis to only mean gaps misses a
large part of the bigger picture. Broadly speaking, as
Fig. 2 indicates, while the uncontrolled log income
gap is positive throughout the distribution, the gap is
higher for low-income businesses as compared to
high-income businesses, with the gap for those at the
10th percentile (300 %) and 25th percentile (154 %)
being substantially higher than the gap at the 75th and
90th percentiles (87 and 66 %, respectively). This
phenomenon of higher gaps at lower levels of the
earnings distribution is similar to the ‘sticky floor’
phenomenon observed in the gender wage gap liter-
ature. Sticky floors are broadly defined as declining
earning gaps as one moves from lower to higher
quantiles of the earnings distribution (e.g., Arulam-
palam et al. 2007).17 Unlike gender wage gaps in most
developed countries that are characterized by ‘glass
Table 3 Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition of log income
Panel A Spec. 1 Panel B Spec. 2
Pooled
coefficients
Non-SCST
coefficients
SCST
coefficients
Pooled
coefficients
Non-SCST
coefficients
SCST
coefficients
Difference 0.667***
(0.075)
0.667***
(0.075)
0.667***
(0.075)
0.641***
(0.077)
0.641***
(0.077)
0.641***
(0.077)
Explained 0.318***
(0.046)
0.297***
(0.044)
0.389***
(0.062)
0.538***
(0.067)
0.519***
(0.065)
0.577***
(0.075)
Unexplained 0.349***
(0.054)
0.369***
(0.058)
0.278***
(0.054)
0.103***
(0.038)
0.122***
(0.041)
0.064
(0.045)
% Unexplained 52.31 55.42 41.7 16.06 19.01 10.05
Contribution to explained component
Years of
education
0.129***
(0.016)
0.124***
(0.016)
0.152***
(0.028)
0.028***
(0.009)
0.03***
(0.01)
0.025
(0.017)
Urban location 0.134***
(0.022)
0.132***
(0.022)
0.143***
(0.027)
0.045***
(0.009)
0.045***
(0.01)
0.047***
(0.015)
Asset ownership 0.205***
(0.021)
0.207***
(0.021)
0.189***
(0.039)
Total person-
hours
0.215***
(0.037)
0.207***
(0.036)
0.231***
(0.044)
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses
*** Significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5 %; * significant at 10 %
Fig. 2 Caste log income gap across percentiles and average gap
17 Specifically, Arulampalam et al. (2007) define a sticky floor
as the 10th percentile wage gap being higher than the 25th
percentile wage gap by at least two percentage points.
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ceilings’ (i.e., increasing wage gaps as one moves
from lower to higher quantiles), several developing
countries reveal a sticky floor, for instance India
(Khanna 2013; Deshpande et al. 2015), China (Chi and
Li 2008), Bangladesh (Nordman et al. 2015) and
Vietnam (Pham and Reilly 2007). In fact, Carrillo
et al. (2014) find that gender wage gaps in poorer and
more unequal countries exhibit sticky floors, whereas
glass ceilings characterize richer and less unequal
ones, using a sample of 12 Latin American countries.
Tables 4 and 5 report quantile regression results for
the two specifications, respectively, for the pooled
model at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th per-
centiles. The estimates show that controlling for
various characteristics reduces but does not eliminate
the caste gap observed in Fig. 2. In Table 5, even with
the most inclusive specification, the caste dummy
remains negative and significant, but compared to
Table 4, its magnitude is much smaller at each of the
percentiles. The sticky floor no longer prevails as in
Table 4. The caste income gap increases from 10 % at
the 10th percentile to 16 % at the median, declines to
10 % at the 75th percentile and increases again up to
14 % at the 90th percentile.
Results of caste-specific quantile regressions are
reported in Tables 6 and 7. Results from Table 7
indicate that while being married and years of
education are associated positively with income for
non-SCSTs, they are not significant for SCSTs. Being
located in urban areas and number of hours spent in the
business seems to confer greater benefits at the lower
end of the earnings distribution than at the higher end,
for both groups. On the other hand, gains from asset
ownership are mostly increasing across the distribu-
tion for both groups. Returns to other fixed or moving
workplaces appear higher at all percentiles for SCSTs
as compared to non-SCSTs.
5.4 Quantile decompositions of log income gaps
We conduct the quantile decompositions separately
using both specifications.18 Table 8 shows the sum-
mary results with the raw difference, characteristics
effect and coefficients effect at the 10th, 25th, 50th,
75th and 90th percentiles using the non-SCST
Table 4 Quantile regression: specification 1 (pooled sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90
SCST -0.349***
(0.056)
-0.532***
(0.073)
-0.467***
(0.051)
-0.368***
(0.031)
-0.275***
(0.039)
-0.266***
(0.038)
Age 0.017**
(0.008)
0.044***
(0.012)
0.038***
(0.007)
0.033***
(0.012)
0.024***
(0.007)
0.022***
(0.008)
Age squared/100 -0.017*
(0.009)
-0.049***
(0.014)
-0.044***
(0.008)
-0.036***
(0.011)
-0.022***
(0.007)
-0.019**
(0.008)
Married 0.141**
(0.056)
0.132
(0.085)
0.149***
(0.046)
0.110
(0.160)
0.080
(0.053)
0.053
(0.053)
Years of education 0.055***
(0.004)
0.052***
(0.005)
0.054***
(0.004)
0.054***
(0.010)
0.059***
(0.003)
0.063***
(0.004)
Urban location 0.721***
(0.049)
0.936***
(0.059)
0.743***
(0.037)
0.599***
(0.051)
0.535***
(0.029)
0.491***
(0.030)
Constant 9.500***
(0.272)
7.822***
(0.218)
8.680***
(0.266)
9.503***
(0.179)
10.238***
(0.180)
10.927***
(0.207)
Observations 7271 7271 7271 7271 7271 7271
R2 0.304
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are reported in parentheses for OLS. Quantile regression standard errors in
parentheses are bootstrapped using 100 replications. State of residence dummy variables included
*** Significant at 1 %; ** significant at 5 %; * significant at 10 %
18 This is done using the STATA program ‘rqdeco’ (Melly
2007).
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Table 5 Quantile regression: specification 2 (pooled sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90
SCST -0.103***
(0.039)
-0.104**
(0.050)
-0.115***
(0.038)
-0.161***
(0.033)
-0.103***
(0.030)
-0.141***
(0.035)
Age 0.022***
(0.007)
0.052***
(0.010)
0.044***
(0.008)
0.021***
(0.006)
0.017***
(0.005)
0.009
(0.007)
Age squared/100 -0.024***
(0.008)
-0.060***
(0.011)
-0.050***
(0.010)
-0.024***
(0.006)
-0.019***
(0.006)
-0.010
(0.007)
Married 0.060
(0.051)
0.172***
(0.055)
0.091*
(0.053)
0.105**
(0.043)
0.078*
(0.042)
0.091*
(0.050)
Years of education 0.012***
(0.004)
0.018***
(0.005)
0.011***
(0.003)
0.012***
(0.003)
0.016***
(0.003)
0.017***
(0.004)
Asset ownership 0.150***
(0.009)
0.118***
(0.011)
0.136***
(0.009)
0.150***
(0.006)
0.170***
(0.006)
0.169***
(0.009)
Urban location 0.250***
(0.036)
0.321***
(0.040)
0.268***
(0.027)
0.227***
(0.024)
0.197***
(0.024)
0.189***
(0.032)
Business or professional group membership 0.158**
(0.063)
0.117**
(0.059)
0.060
(0.053)
0.132***
(0.038)
0.095**
(0.043)
0.169***
(0.047)
Credit or savings group membership -0.120**
(0.048)
-0.060
(0.056)
-0.101**
(0.051)
-0.156***
(0.042)
-0.168***
(0.043)
-0.192***
(0.066)
Caste association membership -0.049
(0.060)
-0.023
(0.057)
0.002
(0.050)
0.044
(0.036)
0.058*
(0.034)
0.048
(0.046)
Development group/NGO membership 0.067
(0.080)
0.273**
(0.114)
0.118
(0.091)
0.008
(0.080)
0.041
(0.077)
-0.013
(0.087)
Co-operative membership -0.096
(0.096)
-0.173
(0.106)
-0.118
(0.095)
-0.020
(0.070)
-0.039
(0.074)
0.124*
(0.075)
Village panchayat or ward committee -0.048
(0.064)
-0.060
(0.070)
0.010
(0.037)
-0.009
(0.034)
0.004
(0.037)
-0.026
(0.048)
Log (number of hours) 0.552***
(0.029)
0.686***
(0.030)
0.634***
(0.022)
0.537***
(0.021)
0.416***
(0.023)
0.325***
(0.027)
Number of workers -0.043*
(0.026)
-0.146***
(0.037)
-0.102***
(0.022)
-0.060***
(0.019)
-0.026
(0.022)
0.003
(0.018)
Workplace-other fixed 0.267***
(0.049)
0.320***
(0.049)
0.274***
(0.033)
0.240***
(0.030)
0.125***
(0.031)
0.116***
(0.039)
Workplace-moving 0.159***
(0.055)
0.279***
(0.056)
0.189***
(0.038)
0.163***
(0.036)
0.005
(0.031)
-0.010
(0.045)
Constant 5.280***
(0.280)
2.589***
(0.332)
3.840***
(0.263)
5.517***
(0.234)
7.246***
(0.199)
8.376***
(0.255)
Observations 7035 7035 7035 7035 7035 7035
R2 0.514
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are reported in parentheses for OLS. Quantile regression standard errors in
parentheses are bootstrapped using 100 replications. State of residence and industry dummy variables included
*** Significant at 1 %; ** significant at 5 %; * significant at 10 %
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coefficients. As noted previously, another set of
estimates could be obtained using the SCST coeffi-
cients (Table 9).
In both Tables 8 and 9, as with the mean decom-
position, we note that upon including more explana-
tory variables in specification 2, the proportion
explained increases. Based on non-SCST coefficients
and focusing our attention on specification 2
(Table 8), we find that the raw log income gap shows
a generally declining trend, first decreasing from 0.95
at the 10th percentile to 0.57 at the median and then
remaining fairly flat thereafter. The proportion of the
income gap due to differences in characteristics lies in
the range of 84–87 % and then increases to about
91 % at the 90th percentile. Using the SCST coeffi-
cients (Table 9), the proportion explained is slightly
lower. Differences in characteristics account for about
70 % of the gap at the 10th and 25th percentiles, 77 %
at the median and 82 % at the 90th percentile.
Mirroring these trends, we find using both coun-
terfactuals that the unexplained component is some-
what larger at the lower end of the conditional earnings
distribution than at the higher end. In Table 8, using
the second specification, the unexplained share decli-
nes from 12 % at the 10th percentile to approximately
8 % at the 90th percentile. While with the non-SCST
earnings structure, the coefficients effect is significant
for the businesses in the middle range of the earnings
distribution (median and third quartile), with the SCST
earnings structure, the unexplained component is
statistically significant throughout the distribution.
Figures 3 and 4 plot the raw gap, the contribution of
characteristics and that of coefficients at each per-
centile of the earnings distribution using the second
specification for the non-SCST and SCST coefficients,
respectively.
6 Discussion
As mentioned earlier, the unexplained component is
the residual gap that remains after all characteristics
are accounted for. It measures the influence of other
unmeasured and unobserved factors, including dis-
crimination. For instance, the IHDS data do not
contain information on family background in running
an enterprise, type of customer base, risk aversion of
the owner, etc., all of which previous literature has
shown to affect enterprise performance. Similarly,T
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there are characteristics such as ability or motivation,
which cannot be measured but can affect the earnings
gap. Similarly, as noted earlier, the explained compo-
nent could include pre-market discrimination.
While we cannot test empirically the channels
through which discrimination manifests itself, there
exist studies that qualitatively document the presence
of active discrimination against SCST businesses.
Prakash (2010) in his 2006–2007 survey of 90 Dalit
businesses in 13 districts spread across 6 states in India
reports difficulty in obtaining initial formal credit in
order to set up an enterprise, resulting in informal
loans being taken at high interest rates. The ones who
did successfully obtain institutional credit were those
in partnerships with upper castes or had local political
contacts that facilitated loan approvals. Kumar (2013)
using data from the 2002–2003 All-India Debt and
Investment Survey finds that public sector banks
Table 8 Quantile decompositions of log income (non-SCST coefficients)
Decile Panel A Spec. 1 Panel B Spec. 2
Col. 1 difference Col. 2
characteristics
Col 3. coefficients Col. 4 difference Col. 5
characteristics
Col. 6 coefficients
10 0.999***
(0.045)
0.539***
(0.093)
0.460***
(0.098)
0.949***
(0.043)
0.829***
(0.062)
0.12
(0.096)
25 0.765***
(0.024)
0.394***
(0.059)
0.371***
(0.063)
0.713***
(0.025)
0.615***
(0.043)
0.098
(0.069)
50 0.604***
(0.017)
0.310***
(0.046)
0.294***
(0.042)
0.568***
(0.018)
0.479***
(0.038)
0.089*
(0.052)
75 0.548***
(0.016)
0.321***
(0.044)
0.227***
(0.036)
0.554***
(0.019)
0.473***
(0.042)
0.081*
(0.042)
90 0.546***
(0.019)
0.315***
(0.052)
0.231***
(0.045)
0.569***
(0.021)
0.522***
(0.049)
0.047
(0.051)
Standard errors in parentheses are based on bootstrapping with 100 replications
*** Significant at 1 %; ** significant at 5 %; * significant at 10 %
Table 9 Quantile decompositions of log income (SCST coefficients)
Decile Panel A Spec. 1 Panel B Spec. 2
Col. 1 difference Col. 2
characteristics
Col 3. coefficients Col. 4 difference Col. 5
characteristics
Col. 6 coefficients
10 0.999***
(0.098)
0.25***
(0.054)
0.749***
(0.045)
0.949***
(0.096)
0.663***
(0.077)
0.286***
(0.043)
25 0.765***
(0.063)
0.277***
(0.037)
0.488***
(0.024)
0.713***
(0.069)
0.491***
(0.049)
0.222***
(0.025)
50 0.604***
(0.042)
0.304***
(0.028)
0.3***
(0.017)
0.568***
(0.052)
0.44***
(0.035)
0.128***
(0.018)
75 0.548***
(0.036)
0.303***
(0.026)
0.245***
(0.016)
0.554***
(0.042)
0.467***
(0.034)
0.087***
(0.019)
90 0.546***
(0.045)
0.296***
(0.028)
0.25***
(0.019)
0.569***
(0.051)
0.469***
(0.031)
0.10***
(0.021)
Standard errors in parentheses are based on bootstrapping with 100 replications
*** Significant at 1 %; ** significant at 5 %; * significant at 10 %
Disadvantage and discrimination in self-employment
123
operating in areas with more upper castes tend to
discriminate more against low-caste loan applicants.
Prakash (2010) also cites Dalit entrepreneurs who
reported often charging less for their products than
their upper-caste peers so that customers ‘forget’ their
castes. Jodhka (2010) through detailed interviews with
Dalit entrepreneurs in two towns in northwest India
finds that caste works as a direct and indirect barrier in
the successful running of their businesses. Most of
them report difficulties on account of their Dalit
identity in mobilizing finance and getting a space to
start their enterprise. A majority of them felt that their
caste identity was perceived as more important than
their professional identity, which led to them being
seen as ‘odd actors’ in the local community.
Another unobserved factor that could constrain
enterprise performance is geographical segregation.
Residential segregation is still prevalent in India with
Dalits living in their own segregated neighborhoods. If
the main customer base of SCST enterprises is their
own community—and given that SCSTs are on
average poorer and have lower purchasing power—
they may have to keep their prices low in order to cater
to members of their own group. For example, Clark
and Drinkwater (2000) explain that ethnic enclaves
can be a source of advantage or disadvantage. While
on the one hand, a concentration of co-ethnics
provides a captive market for producing ethnic goods
that hold particular appeal for the community, on the
other hand, if the ethnic group is poor, then businesses
setup by members of these groups may actually
languish.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, our objective has been to assess the
presence of caste-based discrimination in small
household businesses using the large-scale nationally
representative India Human Development Survey of
2004–2005. Our results show that SCST businesses
fare significantly worse in terms of owner’s education,
household economic status and business characteris-
tics, as compared to their non-SCST counterparts.
Using the non-SCST counterfactual earnings struc-
ture, at least 20 % of the mean earnings gap between
businesses owned by SCSTs and non-SCSTs cannot
be explained by differences in characteristics. Further,
we find that there is substantial heterogeneity in raw
earnings gaps across the earnings distribution reveal-
ing a sticky floor, thereby necessitating the use of
quantile regression-based decomposition methods.
These indicate that the proportion of the earnings
gap on account of differences in characteristics is
generally increasing in the higher deciles of the
conditional earnings distribution.
This paper focuses on one part of the IHDS data set,
viz., data related to household non-farm business,
where we see clear evidence of caste-based disparities
in earnings and other business characteristics, as well
as the existence of discrimination. Desai and Dubey’s
Fig. 3 Quantile decomposition of log income gap: non-SCST
coefficients
Fig. 4 Quantile decomposition of log income gap: SCST
coefficients
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(2011) analysis based on the entire IHDS data set
suggests that our findings fit into the larger pattern of
persistence of caste inequalities, which results in
inequalities in opportunities as well as inequalities in
outcomes. They find an increase in civic and political
participation by marginalized groups, but also docu-
ment how economic and educational disparities con-
tinue to flourish.
In addition to being the first to examine this
question for India, this paper’s findings confirm
patterns that have been observed in the context of
racial and ethnic differences in entrepreneurship in
other countries such as the USA and UK. However,
unlike the USA, for instance, where a number of
migrant groups such as the Koreans and Japanese have
used self-employment as a way to achieve upward
economic and social mobility that does not appear to
be the case for India, as suggested by our findings and
also those in Iyer et al. (2013) and Deshpande and
Sharma (2013). This also suggests that the exuberance
surrounding Dalit Capitalism may be somewhat
misplaced since the reality of most SC and ST
businesses is in stark contrast to the success of a few
Dalit billionaires.
The simultaneous existence of discrimination
against SCs and STs in self-employment and wage
employment presents serious challenges for public
policy, further complicated by the existence of ‘pre-
market’ discrimination for Dalits which results in
lower and poorer quality of educational and skill
attainment. While caste-based job quotas in India
target public sector-salaried employment, that may not
be the appropriate instrument to tackle discrimination
faced by the self-employed. One such recent move is a
2012 public procurement policy for micro- and small
enterprises (MSE) that mandates 4 % of government
procurement to be from MSEs owned by SCs and STs.
Other multi-pronged measures, based on more
research, need to be devised that would tackle
discrimination in both spheres. For instance, looking
at the entrepreneurial success of migrant groups in
countries such as the USA and UK indicates that
Fairlie’s (2006) suggestion of stimulating business
creation in sectors with high growth potential (e.g.,
construction, wholesale trade and business service)
might be one effective element of public policy for
promoting job creation and increasing earnings,
especially in areas where marginalized groups are
concentrated.
A larger question is the relationship between
earnings and wealth, and whether an increase in
earnings (from businesses and elsewhere) is sufficient
to close the wealth gap between communities. Barsky
et al. (2002) find that roughly two-thirds of the mean
difference in wealth between blacks and whites in the
USA can be explained by differences in earnings from
all sources, which suggests that substantial wealth gaps
remain even after controlling for earning differences.
Whether an increase in business ownership by SCs and
STs translates into narrowing wealth gaps would have
to be the subject matter of a future exercise.
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Appendix 1
In order to canvass data on non-farm businesses, the
survey explicitly asks ‘Does any- body in this
household run their own business, however big or
small? Does anybody make something for sale, such as
cloth or some food like pickles? Or does anybody sell
something in a market or to customers of any sort? Or
does anybody provide a service to others for a price,
either a skilled service like a doctor or an unskilled
service like a barber?’
1. Net income: gross receipts less hired workers’
wages less all other expenses such as costs of
materials, rent, interest on loans, etc.
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2. Age: in years (of the de facto decision-maker)
3. Marital status: equals 1 if married, 0 otherwise
(of the de facto decision-maker)
4. Years of education: standard number of years of
education completed (of the de facto decision-
maker)
5. Urban: equals 1 if household is in an urban area,
0 otherwise
6. Business or professional group membership:
equals 1 if the household is a member, 0
otherwise
7. Credit or savings group membership: equals 1 if
the household is a member, 0 otherwise
8. Caste association membership: equals 1 if the
household is a member, 0 otherwise
9. Development group/NGO membership: equals 1
if the household is a member, 0 otherwise
10. Co-operative membership: equals 1 if the house-
hold is a member, 0 otherwise
11. Village panchayat or ward committee: equals 1 if
someone in, or close to the household is a
member, 0 otherwise
12. Total number of hours: total number of hours
spent in the business by all household members
involved in the business
13. Number of workers: number of household
members that worked in the business
14. Workplace type: dummy variables for each of the
three categories—home; other fixed place; other
moving place
15. Industry type (NIC-1987): dummy variables for
each of the nine categories—agriculture, hunting,
forestry, fishing; mining and quarrying; manu-
facturing; electricity, gas and water; construc-
tion; wholesale trade, retail trade, restaurants and
hotels; transport, storage and communication;
finance, insurance, real estate and business ser-
vices; community, social and personal services.
16. State: dummy variables for each of the 22
states—Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh,
Punjab, Uttaranchal, Haryana, Delhi, Rajasthan,
Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Tripura, Assam, West
Bengal, Jharkhand, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Mad-
hya Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra
Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu.
Appendix 2
See Table 10.
Table 10 Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition of log income using the sample of female-run businesses
Panel A Spec. 1 Panel B Spec. 2
Pooled
coefficients
Non-SCST
coefficients
SCST
coefficients
Pooled
coefficients
Non-SCST
coefficients
SCST
coefficients
Difference 0.525***
(0.131)
0.525***
(0.131)
0.525***
(0.131)
0.529***
(0.134)
0.529***
(0.134)
0.529***
(0.134)
Explained 0.296***
(0.072)
0.281***
(0.074)
0.349***
(0.097)
0.364***
(0.11)
0.364***
(0.11)
0.401***
(0.132)
Unexplained 0.229**
(0.116)
0.244**
(0.119)
0.176
(0.12)
0.165*
(0.088)
0.165*
(0.091)
0.128
(0.111)
% Unexplained 43.54 46.41 33.59 31.16 31.28 24.19
Observations 1073 1039
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses
*** Significant at 1 %; ** significant at 5 %; * significant at 10 %
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